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Enlargement is the final act of the reunification of
Europe, which began when the Berlin Wall came
down. It is, fourteen years later, and written large on
a Continental scale, the reunification of Germany
again. As Hans-Werner Sinn points out, the relative
sizes of the parts that are being joined are similar in
the two cases: the population of the Eastern laender
was 26 percent of the population of West Germany;
today the population of the ten CEEC countries –
eight of which entered May 1, and two of which
remain candidates – is 27 percent of the population
of the European Union before enlargement.
Now, as then, enthusiasm for the end of division is
accompanied by concern for the population move-
ments that the removal of barri-
ers will permit.The combination
of dramatic differences in stan-
dards of living, geographic prox-
imity, and common EU citizen-
ship gives credence to the
prospect that these movements
will be large.
The magnitude of the potential flows 
How large? Three recent studies1 project potential
flows from Central and Eastern Europe into Germany,
which has been, and may well remain, the principal
recipient of immigration from this region.These stud-
ies share a common conceptual framework. Potential
flows are related to income and business cycle differ-
ences between the sending and the host country. The
elasticity of migration to these differences is estimated
from patterns observed during the last quarter of the
twentieth century.The three studies allow for and find
strong evidence of stock adjustment dynamics:after an
initial catch-up period, the immigrant population in
the receiving country tends to approach an equilibri-
um level, and net migration falls off.
Though differences in scope and econometric
methodology between the studies generate substan-
tial differences in their estimates of total immigra-
tion over ten or fifteen years, their projections of
flows during the first five years are reasonably simi-
lar.The three studies can be interpreted as projecting
a cumulative inflow of 1.0-1.5 million immigrants
into Germany from the CEEC-10 in the first five
years after labor markets are opened. (see Table 1).2
This implies roughly a cumulative inflow over the
same period of 1.5 to 2.5 million immigrants from
the CEEC-10 to the EU-15.
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Table 1 
Annualnet flows of potential immigration from CEEC-10 into Germany
(Year from removal of restrictions) 
(000's) 




180 221 169  992 
Sinn et al., (2003)
(CEEC-5) 193 248 225  1143 
Boeri et al., (2002)
(CEEC-10) 225 280 150  1170 
CEEC-5 : Poland, Hungary,CzechRepublic, Slovakia, Romania.
CEEC-10 : Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria.
Notes : In 2002, the population of CEEC-5 was 83.5 percent of the population
of CEEC-10.
* This paper has benefitted from the
excellent research assistance of Karin
Thomsen and the efficient secretarial
assistance of Marie-Helene Lebreton. I
am grateful for the comments of Thierry
Verdier and Jose Pinera. All errors and
opinions are mine.
1 DIW (2003), H.-W. Sinn et al. (2003),
and T. Boeri et al. (2002).
2 The Sinn et al. study refers to immigrants
from Poland, the Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, Slovakia and Romania (CEEC-5).
The population of these sending countries,
was 84 percent of the population of the
CEEC-10, in 2002.CESifo Forum 3/2004 37
These flows are substantial. Arrivals into Germany
in the first five years are projected to add up to 1 to
2 percent of the host population. Since arrivals will
tend to cluster, regions like Bavaria and countries
like Austria could well find that the already high
shares of immigrants in their total populations might
double.
These numbers are not,however,without precedent.
They are dwarfed by the influx into West Germany
of German nationals from East Germany and
Poland before the erection of the Berlin Wall.
(10.6 million of these refugees stayed in West
Germany. More came and moved on.) The Poles,
Romanians, Hungarians and others who move to
Germany in the coming decade, may be fewer in
number than the 2 million ethnic Germans, who
were repatriated from former Soviet states and given
automatic citizenship in the first ten years after the
fall of the Berlin Wall.Relative to the size of the host
country, their number is roughly the same as the
number of French citizens repatriated from North
Africa at the end of the Algerian War.
The concerns of policy makers in the EU-15
Sizeable but within the realm of recent experience,
these flows are nonetheless substantial enough to be
disruptive if they are not well handled.Policy makers
have focused on two economic concerns.
1. Labor markets in the host countries must be flex-
ible enough to assimilate the immigrant workers.
2. To the extent that immigrants receive more ben-
efits than they pay taxes,they are a net burden on
the state budget. If these deficits are large and
well-known,they may act as welfare magnets and
attract further immigration, which will, in turn,
magnify the total burden.
The potential difficulty of integrating new workers in
the labor market 
This is the classical concern associated with the
arrival of low-paid immigrants.The fear, bluntly put,
is that “They will steal our jobs.” The implicit sce-
nario is one in which standard wage rates are rigid,
and the natural mechanisms which would otherwise
ensure that new workers find jobs, do not function.
Indeed, if wages are rigid, an increase in the supply
of labor inevitably generates increased unemploy-
ment. Existing workers fear that, by undercutting
them, the immigrants will get the jobs, and they will
become unemployed.
If real wages are flexible,it is not likely to take much
of a wage reduction to absorb a 1 percent increase in
labor supply due to immigration. If the elasticity of
employment to reductions in the real wage rate were
0.8 (a number broadly consistent with the observed
range of econometric estimates), a real wage reduc-
tion of 1.3 percent would suffice to absorb such an
influx. The problem is that if real wages are rigid, a
1 percent influx of immigrants may indeed lead to a
1 percent increase in the unemployment rate, say
from 10 percent to 11 percent. Though the former
development would be imperceptible, the latter
would constitute a serious deterioration.
The potential burden on the budget 
The possible budgetary costs of a surge of immigra-
tion from the new Member States elicit a second,dif-
ferent kind of concern. This is the fear that immi-
grants may draw more in benefits from the state than
they contribute in taxes. The possibility that these
net benefits may differentially attract immigrants to
the host countries with the most generous welfare
provisions, and potentially bankrupt those very pro-
visions, adds to the worry. In order to evaluate this
concern, it is necessary to examine, one by one, the
principal components of the budgetary balance of
the immigrant population. I will base my comments
on the detailed analysis of this question by Sinn et al.
(2003) for the case of Germany.
The social security taxes and transfers from and to
immigrant workers clearly constitute a positive net
contribution to consolidated state budgets. By its
nature, a new immigrant group consists mostly of
young workers paying taxes, and only to a small
degree of retirees receiving benefits. On a cash flow
basis, the immigrants are positive contributors until
their population matures demographically. It has
been estimated that in 1989,the German social secu-
rity budgets received DM9 billion more in taxes
than they paid in benefits to the resident immigrant
population.
To an individual immigrant, the expected lifetime
balance of his personal social security account mat-
ters more than the magnitude of aggregate inter-
generational flows. For this reason, Sinn et al.
(2003) advocate estimating the budgetary balance
of the social security system by comparing the pre-
Panel 2sent discounted value of lifetime contributions with
the present discounted value of lifetime benefits for
representative individuals. On this basis also, immi-
grants are net contributors, for the simple reason
that, under present demographic conditions, the
internal rate of return of the social security system
is substantially below the rate of return on private
savings. Like most workers in the system, immi-
grants never get back, in present discounted value
terms, what they contributed. The total estimated
positive contribution of each immigrant is less than
it appeared on a cash flow basis, but it remains sub-
stantial (see below).
By contrast, unemployment compensation payments
to immigrants do cost the state more than working
immigrants contribute in related taxes,because unem-
ployment rates are higher among immigrant workers.
The higher rates are partly a reflection of the youth
and relatively low skills of the immigrants. But there
is also evidence, in some countries, that particularly
generous unemployment provisions have attracted
more than the natural share of the unemployment
prone. In an econometric study using household sur-
vey data from several nations of the EU-15, Boeri et
al. (2002) find significant evidence of what they call
“excess unemployment dependence” in Denmark,
Austria, the Netherlands and France.
Similarly, tax based welfare benefits paid to immi-
grants also constitute a net cost to the consolidated
state budget of the host country. Because they ini-
tially work for lower than average wages,immigrants
are net recipients of redistributive welfare measures
such as supplemental assistance, housing bonuses
and allocations to public housing. Because they also
have more than the average number of children,they
benefit disproportionately from child allowances.
Highly progressive benefits of this nature often gen-
erate resentment even within a homogeneous com-
munity of native born nationals.The visible nature of
the differences between immigrant and non-immi-
grant dependency exacerbates these sensitivities,
and often causes the distribution of these benefits to
become charged political issues.Notwithstanding the
intensity of the sentiments they arouse,neither these
tax based welfare payments, nor the unemployment
compensation mentioned above are the largest con-
tributors to budgetary imbalance.
In an informative table, Sinn et al. (2003) summarize
the net positive and negative contributions per indi-
vidual of the immigrant population to the consolidat-
ed German state budget, as of 1997. Table 2
(Table 4.14 in the text cited), decomposes the bud-
getary balances which can be associated with the
immigrant population into their component parts.
One sees there the net positive contribution that
Germany’s immigrants made to social security bal-
ances. In 1997, the average immigrant paid DM5,290
in social security taxes,and as a result became entitled
to additional benefits whose present discounted value
was DM1,778. In present discounted value terms, the
average immigrant lost and the state gained the dif-
ference between those two numbers – DM3,512.
Unemployment compensation, a highly politically
sensitive element,generated a net cost to the state of
only DM196 per person per year.
The largest net cost to the State was for the provision
of public goods and tax financed benefits. Sinn et al.
(2003) estimate the cost of these provisions by
specifically allocating the benefits which can be allo-
cated, and distributing the rest uniformly over the
entire population. The result is a large number,
DM12,337 per immigrant in 1997. The number
includes education,fire,police,military expenditures
and the services provided by all other government
employees.The counterpart is general tax payments.
Since the average income of immigrants is lower
than the average income of non-immigrants, their
tax payments are also lower. In 1997, they were
DM7,576 per person. The difference between these
two numbers represents the net cost to the state, per
immigrant,of the supply of general public goods and
tax financed benefits to the immigrant population.
The study does not distinguish between the portion
of this cost which is attributable to public goods, and
the portion which is attributable to welfare pay-
ments, but the relative size of these elements in the
overall state budget suggests that public goods are
the larger component. In short, the biggest source of
the net cost to the budget of the immigrant popula-
tion was the provision of basic public goods.
A Diversity of Policy Proposals
Concerns for labor market disruption and budgetary
costs have generated two kinds of policy prescriptions.
Delays and Quotas. The first response has been to
seek to delay 100 percent immediate implementa-
tion of the right of new EU members to work any-
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where in the Union. The accession agreements,
which the Commission negotiated with each candi-
date country, reserve the right for any of the EU 15
to postpone free access to its labor market for five
years, and after review, to ask for an extension for
another two years. Any citizen of a new member
country who is granted a work permit is to benefit
immediately from all of the employment and social
rights to which EU citizens are entitled.The delay is
optional, not mandatory, and may be applied in part
as well as in full. Germany,Austria and France have
announced that they are freezing work permits for
two years, at the end of which time they will decide
on possible partial or full extension of the freeze.
Other countries have decided to offer labor market
access during the transition period on a staggered,
quota basis, sometimes differentiated by skill, sector
or region.
Limiting Benefits. Britain and Ireland, on the other
hand, have announced that work permits and resi-
dence status will be given to citizens of new member
nations immediately.3 However, both countries pro-
pose to depart from the inclusion principle, broadly
applicable in EU law, in that they will deny public
housing and employment related social benefits (the
most important of which is unemployment compensa-
tion) to immigrants who have not yet worked contin-
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Table 2
Direct Fiscal Effects of Immigration per Immigrant
1)




 0-10 10-25  25+  Total
– in DM – 
Revenuese
Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) 1.817  2.237  3.792  2.773
Statutory Pension Insurance (SPI) 4.053  4.731  6.330  5.290
Social Nursing Insurance (SNI) 252  311  470  368
Unemployment Insurance. 701  1.091  1.393  1.157
Taxation revenues 6.044  6.046  9.687  7.576
Total Revenues 12.866 14.415  21.672  17.164
Expenditurese
SHI 2.970  2.321  3.696  3.018
Implicit debt of SPI
3) 1.362 1.590  2.128  1.778
Implicit debt of SNI
3) 67 83  126  98
Unemployment Insurance  452  667  2.408  1.353
Tax financed transfers and benefits
4) 12.646 12.358  11.644  12.337
Total Expenditures 17.498 17.019  20.001  18.584
Balance 
SHI –1.154  –84  96  –245
SPI 2.691  3.141  4.202  3.512
SNI 185  228  344  269
Unemployment insurance  249  424  –1.015  –196
Tax financed transfers and benefits –6.602  –6.312  –1.957  –4.760
Overall Balance –4.631  –2.603  1.670  –1.419
1) The numbers in the table only reflect the relative positions of those immigrants who were in West Germany in
1997. A direct transfer to the expected immigrants from the Eastern European countries is not permissible as the
structure of future immigrants may be different from that of the stock of immigrants in 1997.
2) Immigrants cover people living in Germany who are not German nationals, but also people who have been nation-
alized and people whose mothers are not German nationals, not including the Aussiedler and Übersiedler groups
as well as asylum seekers.
3) Calculations of the SPI and SNI expenditures use the concept of „implicit tax“. 
4)    Benefits of the government units to private households and average costs of the provision of public goods.
Source: SOEP; calculations of the Ifo Institute. 
3 The only requirement is that immigrants register, once they have
found a job.uously for a minimum period of months (sometimes
said to be 12, sometimes 24). Current EU judicial
practice allows member nations to withhold benefits
to immigrants from other EU states if they are not
working. However, they are deemed to become enti-
tled to the full benefits of the national welfare system,
once they have a job. British authorities argue that
their benefit limitation is implicitly consistent with
the accession treaties framework, because the later
permit exclusion from employment, and therefore
benefits, during the transition period.
The purpose of the British and Irish policies is clear-
ly to discourage migration in the pursuit of welfare
benefits. In the words of UK Home Secretary David
Blunket, “Hard working immigrants are welcome.
Benefit tourists are not.”4
Hans-Werner Sinn,who advocates a similar policy of
no job restrictions combined with benefit limitations
for Germany, argues that the transitional period of
exclusion from benefits should be five to seven years.
The likelihood that benefit exclusions of any signifi-
cant duration will be challenged as contrary to
nondiscrimination provisions in EU law will increase
substantially if the new EU constitution is adopted
and ratified in its present form. As is widely known,
the draft constitution elevates the provisions of the
Social Chapter (which includes entitlements to many
welfare benefits) to the status of inalienable constitu-
tional rights.5 The ability of the British and Irish to
sustain their justification of exclusion before the
European Court will have a major impact on the char-
acter of immigration policies and the course of migra-
tion flows. If the new constitution further entrenches
“social rights,” liberal policy makers will be able to
draw temporary comfort from the delays which will
likely accompany ratification. However, such comfort
would only be temporary, and would be unlikely to
last long enough to be of any avail when it comes time
to admit the next group of new members – including
most likely Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia.
An appraisal 
Any appraisal of polices toward migration from the
new members states must start with a general evalu-
ation of the benefits and costs of the migration itself.
Clearly,from the point of view of the receiving coun-
tries, the potential benefits far outweigh the likely
costs.
The wave of migration which the EU 15 stand ready
to receive during the coming decade is unique. A
million or more young, disciplined workers, who
share a common,cultural and historical heritage,and
who are not marked by any of the ethnic “color
lines” that can make social integration more diffi-
cult, are preparing to join the EU 15 labor force.
They will bring with them a level of educational
attainment, which, though it may be low by Western
European standards, is higher than the average edu-
cational attainment of immigrants from North
Africa, Sub Saharan Africa and the Caribbean.6
This dramatic increase in labor supply is even more
significant than its numbers suggest,because the new-
comers, like all migrants, will be more mobile and
flexible than the existing population. In a prescient
book on the importance of labor supply to Europe’s
Postwar Growth, C.P. Kindleberger noted, almost
forty years ago, “Having already cut his roots to his
native land, the foreign worker is peculiarly mobile.
..Foreign labor is highly mobile....It can transfer read-
ily from firm to firm, occupation to occupation, and
region to region within a country and between coun-
tries and between abroad and home.”7 Europe’s most
conclusive example of the growth dividend of a large
influx of skilled labor is the German miracle itself,
and the depth of its debt to the repatriation of
German refugees from the East.
Not surprisingly, the greater horizontal mobility of
immigrants also correlates with greater vertical
mobility, over time.The social and economic upward
mobility of immigrant populations tends to exceed
that of long-time resident populations. Though
recent immigrants tend to work for lower average
pay levels than long-time residents, after twenty
years in a country, established immigrants, tend to
work for higher average pay levels than their native
counterparts. Sinn et al. (2003) note this pattern in
the life earnings profiles of the cross section of immi-
grants working in Germany in 1997.8 If anything,this
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4 Statement of the Home Secretary, March 25 2004.
5 I have addressed the fallacy of this judicial approach to social pol-
icy in several recent opinion pieces in the Financial Times,
Suddeutsche Zeitung, and the Wall Street Journal Europe.
6 See Boeri et al. (2002), p.104
7 See C.P. Kindelberger, Europe’s Postwar Growth, pp.181 and 210.
8 This pattern is implicit in Table 2, in the comparison of the aver-
age income tax payments of recent immigrants with those of immi-
grants with more than 25 years of residence in Germany.The larg-
er than average tax payments of the latter group lead the authors
to conclude that, after 25 years, immigrants are net positive con-
tributors to the fiscal balance of the German State.CESifo Forum 3/2004 41
pattern may become more marked in the future than
it has been in the past, as intensifying technical
change and global competition increase the sectoral
variability of growth.
In short, admitting a large supply of qualified work-
ers entails on the part of the host country, an initial
investment. Schools, hospitals and housing must be
built, and public services expanded. This is much of
what the initial fiscal deficit,calculated by Sinn et al.
(2003) pays for.But in time,the addition to the work
force, because it is flexible and motivated, produces
a growth dividend which raises living standards for
all of the population,residents and immigrants alike.
In favor of modest, qualified restraints
If immigration from the new Member States has the
potential to be as beneficial in the long term as I
have argued, care should be taken not to obstruct it.
Delaying the arrivals for seven years would clearly
be a mistake. Both of the concerns that have been
elicited by the immediate prospect of new arrivals,
would be better addressed by other measures than
delay.
If labor market rigidities threaten to channel a large
share of the immigration into unemployment, the
correct response is to dismantle the rigidities, not
stop the immigration.
If some tax financed welfare benefits distort location
incentives and the incentive to work, those distor-
tions should be corrected. The inefficiencies they
generate have the potential to be as great for the
native population and for non-nationals coming
from the EU-15 as they are for immigrants from the
CEEC-10. In short, proposals to transform some
welfare provisions into workfare provisions are
more promising candidates for the agenda for
reform than extended immigrant exclusions.
This being said,the frictional costs of adjustment can
be significant, and phasing in what would otherwise
be a large surge of immigration and large demands
on the budget, may have merit. Smoothing the
potential arrivals of the first three years over a five
year period could, while keeping the pressure on,
allow a little time for reforms. Similarly, the British
decision to withhold unemployment compensation
and public housing for at least a year seems to pro-
vide a minimal, reasonable safeguard against what
Home Secretary Blunket has called “welfare
tourism”. In both cases, however, gradualism should
not become an excuse for avoiding reforms. The
objective should be flexible procedures of admis-
sion, not dams to stop the flood.
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